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[1] Chapter Six

Digital Radio Strategies in the United States: A Tale of Two Systems
Alan G. Stavitsky
Michael W. Huntsberger

The case of digital radio in North America illuminates the contradiction between federal
communication policy ideals and realpolitik. The policy of the United States government
gives official imprimatur to robust competition and to local broadcasting that serves ‘the
public interest, convenience or necessity,’ in the words of the federal licensing standard
(Radio Act of 1927). In the decades since the passage of the Federal Radio Act, notions
of capitalism and communication have intertwined as they have been set down in the reconceptions and revisions of the original statute. Within the local marketplace, the theory
goes that unfettered capitalism will lead to efficient exchange of goods and services,
while free and open discourse will yield the best ideas to promote the democratic process
(Stavitsky 1994). On the foundation of this theoretical model, broadcast stations in the
United States have always been licensed at the level of the local community. To ensure
competition, regulators have historically set and enforced limits on the number of stations
any individual or agency could own.

Broadcast regulation in the United States, however, has long been marked by tension
between the ideals of localism and competition, and the lure of centralization. While
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national broadcasting systems dominated the development of European radio, U.S. radio
began in the early 1920s with independent local stations drawing upon local voices. The
rhetoric of the time reflected utopian notions of radio as a conduit of civic discourse
through which citizens would deliberate the public affairs of the community. In practice,
however, network broadcasting developed rapidly and the ‘chains’, as the first national
broadcasting corporations were originally known, became the dominant source of
programming within radio’s formative first decade. In addition to this centralization of
content, control of stations became increasingly concentrated as broadcasters successfully
lobbied for gradual relaxation of ownership limits. For radio, this deregulatory trend
culminated in passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which eliminated all
restrictions on national ownership, while retaining limits within any particular market
(Telecommunications Act of 1996).

This capsule history points to the ambiguity of U.S. communication policy. The focus of
regulation remains on local service, while content and control are largely centralized.
Though the metaphor of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ implies robust competition, ownership
has been allowed to concentrate. Further, the Federal Communications Commission,
while seeking to bring the benefits of new technology to industry and public, has
historically been reluctant to set technological standards, preferring to let the market
decide. At times this lack of symmetry between regulators and industry has had
significant consequences. The commission’s failure to set standards for AM stereo
systems in the 1980s helped doom the technology to irrelevance (Sterling and Kittross
2002: 570). Similar ambiguities have characterized the emergence of digital radio, as
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U.S. regulators have been unprepared or unwilling to face the challenges presented by
new technologies, and have consistently deferred to industrial imperatives as they
established a policy framework.

[2] Stumbling toward a digital radio standard
Initiatives to migrate broadcast radio in the United States from analogue to digital
systems began in the early 1980s, concurrent with similar efforts in Europe and Asia.
With the introduction of audio compact disc players to the consumer market in 1982,
U.S. broadcasters sought methods to upgrade the audio quality of their services in order
to provide CD-quality sound (Radio World 2008). Broadcast transmission and reception
systems of the time were inadequate for the task, leading to a variety of experimental
approaches to ‘going digital’. To accommodate the additional bandwidth necessary for
digital encoding and transmission, Boston public radio station WGBH experimented with
modulating a digitized audio programme stream on the licensee’s UHF public television
channel. While the experiment was considered successful, the broadcasts were available
to an audience of perhaps a few hundred people who owned professional digital audio
processors. WGBH was also among the first to use digital systems to distribute
programme material between remote and head-end facilities (Bunce 1986: 21).

During this period of digital experimentation, the historic regulatory structures and
policies that had governed U.S. broadcasting since the 1930s were undergoing
fundamental and profound change. With the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan
and the subsequent appointment of Mark Fowler as chair of the Federal Communications
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Commission in 1981, broadcasting licenses that had been rigorously regulated by the
F.C.C. became commodities that could be easily traded on the open market. Widely
credited for referring to television as ‘a toaster with pictures’, Fowler de-emphasized the
Commission’s policy research and recommendation functions in favour of market-based
solutions derived from the practices of industry (Boyer 1987: C15). Notable for
decisions that eliminated requirements for public service programming, lowered
standards for license renewal and removed restrictions on the sale of licenses, the F.C.C.
under Fowler nurtured an environment that encouraged private interests to take the lead
in the development of digital broadcasting in the United States.

The challenge emerged in 1990, as the F.C.C. considered whether to authorize both
terrestrial and satellite-delivered digital radio services. Somewhat surprisingly, the first
initiative to come before the Commission did not originate with one of the major U.S.
broadcasting companies or equipment manufacturers, but from a start-up: Satellite CD
Radio Inc. petitioned the F.C.C. to allocate space in the S-band between 12.2 and 12.7
GHz for the transmission of signals to geostationary earth-orbiting satellites capable of
transmitting a nationwide, multi-channel digital audio service directly to consumers. The
Satellite Digital Audio Radio System [S-DARs] – satellite radio – would be available
throughout the continental United States, allowing the consumer to travel coast to coast
without experiencing interference or service interruptions (Huntsberger 2001). Charging
that the Satellite CD plan threatened the local service of 12,000 terrestrial radio
broadcasters, the National Association of Broadcasters asked to F.C.C. to dismiss the
application. At the time, the president of Satellite CD observed that the commercial
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broadcasters were not motivated by aspirations to preserve the traditions of local service
or the public interest, but rather by the more essential desire to restrict competition (New
York Times 1990: D4).

On behalf of its members, the vast majority of whom are commercial enterprises, the
N.A.B. considered a variety of systems that could be capable of providing CD-quality
digital audio broadcast services, including delivery by cable, satellite, and terrestrial
channels. As the World Administrative Radio Conference moved toward adoption of the
DAB system, the N.A.B. was pushing for the adoption of the Eureka 147 system as the
U.S. standard (New York Times 1991: 115). But L-band DAB faced a host of challenges.
Because Eureka 147 was suitable for terrestrial and satellite transmission, existing
broadcasters feared that the technology might provide parity for S-DARS. In addition,
broadcasters viewed the multiplex capability of Eureka 147 as an opportunity for new
terrestrial competition, and worried that Eureka 147 allocations might not match existing
coverage.i Public agencies had other concerns. Following the success of Operation Desert
Storm, a coalition of forces in the administration of George H.W. Bush moved to protect
the L-band for the use by the U.S. Department of Defense for ‘aeronautical flight-test
telemetry’ for the development of new, advanced weapons systems (Belsie 1992: 9).

As the debate over spectrum allocation and transmission standards proceeded, an
initiative developed jointly by commercial ownership groups CBS Radio, the Gannett
Company and Group W Broadcasting proposed a system that would allow for
simultaneous transmission of analogue and digital signals on existing FM frequencies,
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and possibly on AM channels as well. Such an in-band on-channel [IBOC] system
offered the possibility that the move from analogue to digital technology could be
accomplished without any dislocation to the existing marketplace for broadcast radio
programming and advertising. Specifically, the IBOC system promised existing licensees
the chance to enhance the sound of their broadcasts and carry additional services on their
signals without opening channels for new competitors. But it would not be easy: one CBS
executive compared the challenge to ‘fishing out millions of needles every second from
an endless line of haystacks’ (Andrews 1992: D8).

Throughout the 1990s, the N.A.B. considered several approaches to IBOC digital radio.
But the primary policy agenda for commercial radio broadcasters was characterized by
their united and vocal opposition to satellite radio. At every turn, the N.A.B. asserted the
position that nationwide satellite services would undermine the ability of local
broadcasters to ‘attract listeners, sell advertising and maintain their viability’ (Andrews
1992: D1). While engineering trials for satellite broadcasting proceeded smoothly, the
progress of satellite radio in the sphere of public policy slowed to an almost glacial pace.
The F.C.C. asserted that ‘existing radio broadcasters can and should have the opportunity
to take advantage of new digital radio technologies’, and acknowledged industry
concerns that the national footprint of satellite radio posed a competitive threat to local
stations, reaffirming localism as a ‘touchstone value’ (F.C.C. 1999: 4). At the same time,
while recognizing the terrestrial and satellite services ‘would compete to some extent’,
the Commission concluded that satellite radio would complement broadcast radio ‘by
providing regional and national services’, and that IBOC DAB was not yet technically
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feasible. Backed by arguments for technology advancement and market diversity, the
proponents of satellite radio ultimately succeeded, convincing the F.C.C. to allocate
spectrum and consider license applications from four private companies (Andrews 1995:
D14). Two of these companies survived as XM Radio, launched in November 2001, and
Sirius Satellite Radio, launched in 2002 – the dramatic launches garnering considerable
attention from the press and investors on Wall Street. Though they were separate and
competing companies, the fates of the two digital services would remain connected.

Faced with the realities of competition, the N.A.B. moved ahead with efforts to develop a
workable IBOC system. It would be nearly four years until the CBS-Gannett partnership,
operating as USA Digital Radio, filed the first Petition for Rulemaking with the F.C.C. to
permit IBOC as the terrestrial digital radio broadcast standard in the U.S (Desposito
1999: 45), and another three years before the Commission approved an IBOC system for
use in the United States (Feder 2002: C3). While IBOC on the FM band received the
approval of the National Radio Systems Committee, the influential engineering group
could not endorse similar technology for AM broadcasting, citing night-time interference
problems. Because one of the selling points of IBOC had been improved fidelity for AM
broadcasters on a par with FM-band signals, any strategy that might move forward with
FM-IBOC only was questionable. Nevertheless, IBOC was presented to broadcasters
with great fanfare at the 2002 NAB convention as a fully operational system and
approved by the F.C.C. later that year, despite AM transmission problems and a lack of
testing with consumer receivers.
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Significantly, the Commission’s decision did not include a calendar mandate for digital
conversion. With a tip of the hat to former Chairman Fowler’s bedrock belief in the
power of free markets, regulators followed the preferences of industry leaders and turned
to the forces of supply and demand to catalyze the adoption of digital radio in the U.S.
The approved IBOC system would be manufactured and distributed exclusively by
iBiquity Digital, and available only under license from the manufacturer. The rush to
market was driven by a desire to reassure Wall Street of the continued viability of
terrestrial radio in the digital age, even as satellite radio systems and services began to
appear in the consumer market (Ala-Fossi and Stavitsky: 2003).

As commercial radio interests took more than a decade to roll out their chosen digital
system, a variety of chipmakers and equipment manufactures capitalized on the slow,
deliberate pace of IBOC development. Motorola, Blaupunkt and Texas Instruments were
among the companies that developed technologies for digitizing, filtering and
manipulating analogue radio signals to improve reception and audio quality (Feder 2002:
C2). The public release of the World Wide Web allowed stations to deliver digitallyencoded audio programming directly to personal computers, and created a global delivery
platform for audio content and services. Software designers developed algorithms that
reduced the size of digital audio data files so they could be economically captured,
manipulated, stored and retrieved by personal computers, without apparent loss of sound
quality. By 2001, when Apple released the iPod portable player and the iTunes software
that allowed consumers to easily select, purchase, store, and replay thousands of digitally
encoded songs on demand, the consumer market for audio media had entirely outstripped
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the scenarios envisioned by U.S. commercial broadcasters, and the N.A.B. Satellite radio
had become just one of a host of digital audio technologies and services competing with
terrestrial radio for the attention of American consumers.

The symbiosis of the terrestrial and satellite digital systems re-emerged with the 2008
merger of XM and Sirius into a single, corporate entity. When the F.C.C. issued the
original licenses to the two companies, it did so with the stipulation that one company
would not be permitted to acquire control of the other. This stipulation was intended to
ensure competition and mollify terrestrial broadcasters, but once the business plans of the
two companies were set into motion, both satellite providers saw their operating costs
soar like their respective launch vehicles, and eventually Sirius and XM sought
government approval to merge in 2006. This led to eighteen months of official
deliberation by the U.S. Justice Department which considers anti-trust matters. At issue
was the definition of market; were XM and Sirius in effect competing with local radio
stations, transmitting from 25,000 miles up? Viewed in this way, a satellite radio
monopoly could create a formidable challenge that threatened the economic viability of
local terrestrial broadcasters and, by extension, the bedrock value of localism.

But Sirius and XM argued that satellite radio is simply another aural alternative in an
audio marketplace that includes not just terrestrial radio, but also Internet audio services,
iPods and other digital players, and audio-enabled cell phones. The Justice Department,
and eventually the F.C.C., took the latter view, ruling that the merger would not hurt
competition. ‘In several important segments of their business, with or without the merger,
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the parties simply do not compete today,’ said Thomas O. Barnett, head of the Justice
Department’s anti-trust division. ‘Some people may view iPods as a particularly good
alternative. They may view HD radio as an alternative’ (quoted in Philip Shenon,
3/25/08, NYT, Justice Dept Approves XM Merger with Sirius). As Sirius and XM move
to combine their operations, sales, marketing and customer service functions, the shortterm benefits of the merger will accrue first to the business enterprises. For consumers,
the full value of a combined service and its competitive impact on the market, will not be
apparent until receivers capable of picking up both satellite services become available,
perhaps in the next year (Pizzi 2008: 42).

[2] Playing catch-up
Given the long road to IBOC implementation, U.S. radio broadcasters have moved
relatively quickly to bring the technology to market and stimulate consumer interest.
Capitalizing on burgeoning interest in the federally mandated conversion to High
Definition Television [HDTV], iBiquity rechristened the IBOC system as HD Radio.ii
By October 2003, 280 stations in more than 100 markets had purchased licenses for HD
Radio technology, and but only 70 were broadcasting digitally encoded FM signals
(Berger 2003: G3; iBiquity 2003). HD Radio-capable home receivers appeared at the
2004 Consumer Electronics Show, and several automobile manufacturers carried HD
Radio receivers in their 2004 models. But consumer interest was marginal at best. The
receivers were expensive: Kenwood’s KTC-HR100 add-on tuner for car stereos carried a
price tag of $350 (Berger), far more than add-on units for satellite radio, and a substantial
price to pay for CD-quality audio in the listening environment of a moving car with an
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80+ dB noise floor. HD receivers designed for home use entered the market with retail
prices of $500 or more (Fleishman 2005: C11). More recently, prices for home and auto
receivers have moderated, with some units now costing less than $100 (iBiquity 2009).
However, power requirements for HD chips exceed specifications appropriate for
personal devices, and no manufacturer currently offers a portable HD unit that can
complement or compete with Apple’s iPod and similar digital players, shutting HD
broadcasters out of this most significant market.

Faced with such challenges, in 2005 some of the largest commercial radio companies in
the U.S., including Clear Channel Radio, Entercom and Infinity Broadcasting, formed the
HD Digital Radio Alliance, a co-ordinated, national strategic marketing campaign to
‘accelerate the rollout of HD Digital Radio’ (HD Digital Radio Alliance 2005).
Paradoxically, the campaign was undertaken at a political level in the name of protecting
the U.S. ideal of locally focused and controlled radio stations, despite criticism that the
consortium violates anti-trust law. The strategy of the Alliance positioned HD in
opposition to satellite radio, offering a parallel benefit – programme diversity – without
the cost of a satellite radio subscription. Beginning with radio spot advertising on 280
stations in 28 markets, valued at $200 million, the campaign touts the benefits of HD to
listeners, and promoted the availability of receivers for new and existing cars and homes
(HD Alliance 2006). The effort provides broadcasters with logos, brochures, print ads,
web banners and other graphic materials, an audio podcast, a video with tips for
consumers, and links to rebate offers from HD radio manufacturers and dealers (HD
Alliance 2009).
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While the Alliance touts the efficacy of these efforts, a 2007 study by independent
research firm Bridge Ratings concludes that market penetration by HD radio lags far
behind competing technologies, especially analogue AM and FM radio, which continues
to serve over 90% of Americans each week. iPods and other digital players reach 30% of
the population, and satellite radio penetrates almost 5%. In comparison, HD Radio
reaches less than 1% of Americans: Bridge estimates that 450,000 Americans listen to
HD radio every week, compared to 57 million that listen to some form of Internet radio
(Bridge Ratings 2007). One analyst asserts that the steady, deliberate promotional
strategy of the Alliance is ‘difficult to support’. Such a long-term, continuous campaign
is perhaps the hardest type of promotional exercise to undertake successfully, as opposed
to the sort of short-term, high-visibility strategies that are preferred by marketing
professionals (Pizzi 2008: 15). These developments suggest that HD radio has a long way
to go to catch up with other digital audio technologies available in the U.S.

U.S. public radio broadcasters have focused primarily on the feasibility of using the
secondary audio channels [SACS] on HD Radio signals to provide additional programme
services to niche audiences. Throughout 2003, field tests conducted by NPR Labs
examined the performance of HD channels carrying two programme streams. The
findings of the Tomorrow Radio Project demonstrated that spectrum split into two
streams was sufficiently robust to provide high-quality reception in mobile environments
(NPR Labs 2004). In subsequent years, NPR Labs has become a leader in HD Radio
research, publishing findings on coverage and interference.
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Digitization also offers the promise of new public-service applications. Many public
radio stations use their analogue sidebands to broadcast programmes for visually
impaired listeners, but these ‘radio reading services’ require distribution of specially
equipped receivers. HD Radio accommodates these services on multicast side channels
(though this does by necessity still require listeners to obtain a digital receiver). Further,
NPR Labs, the research-and-development wing of National Public Radio, collaborated
with Harris Corporation, a U.S. communication equipment manufacturer, and Towson
University engineers to develop an audio-captioning system that does, in effect, subtitle
radio programming for hearing-impaired people (CITE). The system was demonstrated in
live coverage of the U.S. presidential election returns in November 2008 (‘Captioned
radio broadcast to enable millions of deaf and hard-of-hearing to experience NPR’s live
coverage of presidential election for the first time,’ 21 October 2008, news release,
International Center for Accessible Radio Technology, http://I-cart.net).

[2] International concerns
Presently, no nation or governing body beyond the United States has considered HD
Radio as a standard for digital broadcasting. Yet the nation’s position as a dominant
economic and political power, and one of the world’s largest markets for broadcasting
technology for consumers and professionals, presents considerable challenges and
opportunities for other digital radio interests around the world. In addition, the U.S.
shares two borders; one with Canada totaling almost 9,000 kilometres, and one with
Mexico of just over 3,000 kilometres. This shared geography poses a number of issues
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related to spectrum allocation, cross-border interference, and the availability of services
and equipment in professional and consumer markets.

For many years, Canada embraced the Eureka 147 DAB standard for the transition to
digital radio broadcasting. But a 2006 report on the future of broadcasting in Canada
recognized that analogue FM remained a dominant form of radio, and that Canadian
broadcasters have ‘adopted new technology platforms through Internet streaming and
podcasting, as well as entering into content partnership arrangements with other
undertakings including satellite providers’, particularly those based in the U.S. (O’Neill
2008: 32). Recognizing the new realities in the digital audio marketplace, the Canadian
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission revised the nation’s digital radio
policy to consider DAB as one of a number of appropriate technologies, including HD
Radio that might be adopted in Canada. The CRTC also announced it was prepared to
authorize IBOC services in Canada (Radio 2006). Field trials conducted in Toronto in
2007 concluded that the technology poses interference problems for existing analogue
FM services, and that implementation will have to be accompanied by review and
revision of spectrum management rules (Bouchard 2007). Mirroring the U.S. experience,
the Bouchard report observes that consumers will ultimately decide whether HD services
will be viable in Canada. To date, no agency has applied for authority to test or adopt HD
Radio for any location in Canada.

More recently, the Federal Telecommunications Commission of Mexico authorized HD
Radio transmission within 320 miles of the U.S. border. Recognizing ‘the extent of the
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development and implementation of the IBOC system’ in the U.S., COFETEL elected to
forego further research and field trials in advance, taking ‘decisive action’ to bring HD
Radio to listeners in northern Mexico (Radio 2008). Mexican regulators directed stations
interested in HD transmission to request authorization and assist with assessments of the
technology. Conveniently for American broadcasters, the 320 km limit accommodates the
signals of stations broadcasting from San Diego, Tucson, El Paso and other metropolitan
areas along the border.

[2] Social implications: Radio’s ‘third chance’?
The British broadcaster Charles A. Siepman, who was called upon by the F.C.C. to write
the well-regarded (but ultimately ignored) Blue Book on public service in American
broadcasting, referred to the development of FM broadcasting in the 1940s as ‘radio’s
second chance’. He wrote of the social potential of FM to redeem radio’s promise after
the AM band became awash in mass entertainment and advertising (Siepman 1946). If
FM represented radio’s second chance, might the digital transition constitute the
medium’s third chance?

It’s clear that digital radio offers some of the same advantages noted by Siepman in the
case of FM – additional channels of communication through multicasting, and improved
audio quality. Satellite providers tout the availability of scores of channels, more than
170 on XM and more than 130 on Sirius (some channels were heard on both services
after the merger). ‘Everything worth listening to is now on Sirius,’ reads the corporate
slogan (www.sirius.com). Talk programming crosses the political spectrum, from the
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Sirius Left channel of liberal content, to Sirius Patriot, a conservative outlet. Like oldies
music? XM offers separate channels for each decade from the 1940s through the 1990s,
as well as broadcasts of the Super Bowl in 10 languages, including Flemish, Hungarian
and Mandarin Chinese (www.xmradio.com).

HD Radio, while offering fewer channels because of technical limitations, nonetheless
seeks to provide programme alternatives beyond the usual broadcast fare. In Portland,
Oregon, for example, the 23rd-largest radio market in the U.S., fourteen broadcasters were
multicasting secondary channels at this writing. Formats included blues, comedy and all
Northwest rock bands (www.ibiquity.com), none of which would generally be considered
commercially viable in a traditional analogue model.

In addition to programme diversity, digital transmission of course offers the enhancement
of connectivity to the digital realm, of radio as gateway to web access and data services.
Digital receivers can display song titles, news headlines and weather or traffic alerts, as
well as interactivity with advertising. The commercial possibilities – such as the instant
ability to push a button and buy a download of a song being played, or a product being
advertised – makes digital transmission attractive to marketers. And, given the growing
diffusion of third-generation mobile phones, software engineers have designed
applications to allow users to listen to web streams of radio on their so-called ‘smart
phones’ (Everhart 2009).
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Do the potential programming, access and service benefits of digital radio, however,
align with the ‘touchstone value’ of localism? In theory, the ‘digital plenty’ could allow
for hyper-local, multicast channels that serve targeted geographic or ethnic communities.
In practice, however, the early returns point to narrowcasting on secondary IBOC
channels defined in terms of musical taste, such as the ‘indie-rock’ channels starting to
proliferate on HD radio. Of course, satellite radio, as a national service, primarily
construes ‘localism’ in terms of genre tastes, with the occasional exception of imagined
communities such as the gay and lesbian audience served by Sirius’ OutQ channel
(www.sirius.com/outq).

[2] Supervening social necessity?
While regulators and industry leaders invested years of energy and millions of dollars in
competing digital radio systems, consumers have remained largely unimpressed.
Presented with a variety of digital audio systems, the public has gravitated to iPods, smart
phones and Internet audio, as indicated in the Bridge Ratings study. This reflects
Winston’s notion that there must be ‘supervening social necessity’ if a technological
innovation is to be widely diffused (Winston 1998). Put simply, the innovation must
serve some social need if it is to succeed; a commercial purpose alone is not necessarily
sufficient. The rapid acceptance of early radio can be linked to satisfying the
entertainment and information needs of a dispersed and growing population, as well as
commercial needs for mass marketing (Lax 2003).
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In contrast, where is the consumer demand for digital radio in the U.S.? What is the
‘killer application’? Data from the Project for Excellence in Journalism indicates that the
number of broadcasters switching to HD Radio peaked at in 2006 at 522 stations – the
year HD became available to the public. The number of new HD stations fell 25 per cent
to 394 in 2007 (Radio 2008). While the data may reflect reluctance on the part of
terrestrial station owners to shoulder the burden of conversion in the present difficult
economic circumstances, the downward trend may also indicate that HD Radio has
passed the peak in the bell curve of technology adoption described by Rogers (2003:
273). The PEJ study sees clouds on the horizon for satellite radio as well: public
awareness of satellite radio has leveled off considerably since 2006 at about 60%.
Interest in satellite radio remains flat as well, with only 3% responding that they are ‘very
likely’ to subscribe in the next 12 months. Concurrently, 44% said cell phones are having
‘a big impact on their lives’, and today’s smart phones are capable of receiving Internet
streaming audio (including the streams of XM and Sirius), and analogue radio – but not
HD Radio. In summary, it seems that analogue broadcast radio remains ubiquitous in the
U.S., and hundreds of millions of receivers will work just fine for the vast majority of
listeners for the foreseeable future.

What Levy wrote in the context of European digitization applies in the U.S. case:
‘Technological change tended more often to lead to minor reforms of existing
institutional structures…than to be used as an opportunity for a radical overhaul of either
these institutions or hitherto shared policy objectives’ (1999: 122). The lack of
supervening social necessity, coupled with the absence of a government mandate to go

18

digital (as in the case of television), crippled the dual system approach promoted by
industry and regulators. Instead, consumers wearing ear buds are driving the ‘radical
overhaul’.
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Notes
i

Personal communication from Skip Pizzi, 11 May 2009.

ii

“The 'HD' in 'HD Radio' does not mean 'high-definition' or 'hybrid digital'. It is part of
iBiquity's brand for its digital radio technology” (iBiquity 2009).
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